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1 Introduction
The welfare cost of ination has been a fundamental issue in monetary economics and macroeco-
nomics. In the literature, estimates of the welfare costs of moderate ination are generally modest
or small. By shedding light on the increasing returns to production specialization (hereafter IRPS),
this study obtains a substantial welfare cost in a simple endogenous growth model in which (i)
households are subject to a cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint and (ii) rms operate in a monopo-
listically competitive market with endogenous entry.
By focusing on CIA constraint models, a seminal study is that by Cooley and Hansen (1989)
who report a welfare cost of ination of around 0:5% (increasing ination from the Friedman-rule
value of deation of  4% to 10%) in a Neoclassical growth model.1 In an endogenous growth
model with an endogenous labor-leisure trade-o¤, Gomme (1993) also obtains a small welfare cost:
a 10% money growth rate results in a welfare cost of less than 0:03% of output. Dotsey and Ireland
(1996) consider the services of a nancial intermediary and nd that the gure is about 3:3%.2 By
highlighting labor market imperfections (labor frictions), Heer (2003) obtains a welfare cost of 0:65%
(increasing ination from the Friedman optimal deation level of  1% to 1:3%).3 By highlighting
product market imperfections, Wu and Zhang (2000) and Chu et al. (2012) estimate the welfare
cost of ination and examine the role played by a price markup. In an RBC model of monopolistic
competition with increasing returns to scale, Wu and Zhang (2000) show that the welfare cost is
around 2:7% when ination increases from the Friedman optimal deation level of  4% to 10%
and the cost is increasing in the price markup. In an endogenous-growth model of R&D, Chu et
al. (2012) obtain a corresponding gure of around 1:76%, while the positive relationship between
the welfare cost and the markup is numerically conrmed.
IRPS have been shown to have their practical importance. Romer (1987) indicates that an
expansion in the number of rms leads the same assortment of commodities to be manufactured
in specialized rms. This renders a positive externality on the rmsproduction, raising aggregate
1With regard to money-in-the-utility-function models, the reader can refer to, for example, Lucas (2000) and Chu
and Lai (2013).
2Furthermore, Wen (2015) nds a relatively substantial welfare cost of ination (about 9:6%) when the liquidity
function of money and the precautionary motive of money demand are taken into account so as to capture the
bu¤er-stock-insurance value of cash.
3Recently, Lagos and Wright (2005) and Chu et al. (2014) obtained a substantial welfare cost of ination by
developing a search model of monetary exchange.
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output more than proportionally.4 Nowadays, many products are becoming more modular over time
and this development is often associated with a change in industry structure towards higher degrees
of specialization.5 This in turn has contributed to specic activities becoming more suitable and has
attracted a large number of de novo entrants (see Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996 and Langlois, 2002).
Due to their importance, IRPS have been introduced in order to provide a possible explanation for
the real-wage and scal puzzle (Devereux et al., 1996a), the international trade puzzle (Krugman,
2009) and the properties of the business cycle (Chang et al., 2011 and Pavlov and Weder, 2012),
as well as to modify the Solow residual by remeasuring technology shocks (Devereux et al., 1996b).
In this paper, we will show that the existence of IRPS plays a crucial role in terms of governing
the magnitude of the welfare cost of ination and its relationship with the price markup.
We analytically show that in the balanced-growth-path equilibrium an expansionary monetary
policy raises ination, which retards economic growth and lowers social welfare. The latter implies
that the optimal ination follows Friedmans rule. More importantly, the negative e¤ects on growth
and welfare are amplied by a price markup if the degree of IRPS is relatively high. By contrast,
the price markup can mitigate these unfavorable e¤ects if the degree of IRPS is relatively low.
Numerically, we o¤er a signicantly high welfare cost of 8:796% given that endogenous entry leads
to IRPS. Moreover, our quantitative analysis indicates that the welfare cost of ination exhibits
an inverted U-shaped relationship with the price markup. When the status quo price markup is
relatively low (less than 1:3 in our parameterization), the welfare cost of ination is more pronounced
in a less competitive market, but when the status quo price markup is relatively high, it turns out to
be less pronounced in a less competitive market. The welfare cost of ination reaches a maximum
of 8:801%, when the price markup is 1:3. This non-monotone is sharply in contradiction to the
conventional notion, as in Wu and Zhang (2000) and Chu et al. (2012). Besides, we nd that the
welfare cost of ination is unambiguously increasing in the degree of IRPS.
4Conceptually, IRPS are similar to the classical notion of economies of scope (see Holtz-Eakin and Lovely, 1996
and more recently Blancard et al., 2011).
5Specialization is also often used to explain higher productivity in the US. See Rapping (1965) and Balassa (1967)
for the details.
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2 The Model
Consider an economy consisting of households, rms, and a government. Households derive utility
from consumption, but incur disutility from work. There are two types of goods: a homogeneous
nal good which is the numéraire and di¤erentiated intermediate goods indexed by i = 1; :::; Nt,
where Nt is the number of intermediate goods at time t. The nal good is produced by competitive
rms, while intermediate goods are produced by monopolistically competitive rms. A government
representing the scal and monetary authorities, on the one hand, balances its budget and, on the
other hand, sets the optimal money growth rate.
2.1 Households
There is a unit measure of identical, innitely lived households. By following Hansens (1985)
specication of indivisible labor, the lifetime utility function of the representative household is
given by:
U =
Z 1
0
e t(lnCt  BHt)dt; (1)
where Ct is consumption, Ht are hours worked, (> 0) is the time preference rate, and B(> 0)
is the preference weight on leisure (or work).6 Given the initial capital K0, households maximize
their lifetime utility (1) subject to the following budget and cash-in-advance (CIA) constraints:
_Kt + _Mt =WtHt +RtKt +
t + Tt   Ct   tMt   Kt: (2)
Ct Mt; 0 <  < 1: (3)
where Kt is capital, Mt is the real money balance, t is ination, Wt is the real wage rate, Rt is the
real interest rate,  is the depreciation rate, 
t is the aggregate prot, and Tt is the real lump-sum
transfer from the government. Equation (3) indicates that in the Lucasian CIA constraint economy,
households hold money Mt in order to facilitate the nal good purchases.7
Let 1;t and 2;t be the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the households budget constraint
and CIA constraint, respectively. Thus, the necessary conditions for the households optimization
6Our result is robust to a standard RBC utility function, lnCt  BH
1+
t  1
(1+)
.
7The qualitative results of this paper do not change in alternative models of money, such as in the money-in-the-
utility-function and transactions cost models.
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problem are:
Ct :
1
Ct
= 1;t

1 + 
2;t
1;t

; (4)
Ht : B = 1;t Wt; (5)
Mt :   1;t t + 2;t =   _1;t + 1;t ; (6)
Kt : 1;t(Rt   ) =   _1;t + 1;t ; (7)
lim
t!1
1
Ct
Kte
 t = 0 and lim
t!1
1
Ct
Mte
 t = 0: (8)
Equation (4) equalizes the marginal benet and marginal cost of consumption, with the latter being
the sum of the shadow price of the real money balances and the shadow price of the CIA constraint
on consumption. Equation (5) is the households labor supply. Equations (6) and (7) refer to
the optimal conditions for money and capital holdings, respectively. To ensure that (2) can be
transformed into an innite-horizon, present-value budget constraint, the transversality conditions
in (8) have to be met. Moreover, combining (6) and (7) yields the no arbitrage condition between
capital and real money balances: 2;t1;t = Rt    + t. With that, (4) and (5) allow us to derive
1
BCt
=
[1 + (Rt    + t)]
Wt
; (9)
implying that the consumption-leisure tradeo¤ is a¤ected by the portfolio between capital and real
money balances.
2.2 Firms
The production side is built on the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) model of monopolistic competition with
endogenous entry which leads to increasing/decreasing returns to production specialization.
2.2.1 Final-good rms
The nal-good sector is perfectly competitive. By following Bénassy (1996) and Pavlov and Weder
(2012), the nal good Yt is produced by simply using a continuum of intermediate inputs yt(i) for
i 2 [0; Nt], based on the following generalized form of production function:
Yt = N
1+v  1

t
Z Nt
0
yt (i)di
 1

; (10)
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where  2 (0; 1) measures the degree of substitution between intermediate goods and v measures the
returns to production specialization. The production function (10) displays a generalized form of
increasing/decreasing returns to production specialization in the sense that the larger the number of
intermediate rms is, the higher (lower) is the amount of nal output obtained. Under a symmetric
equilibrium in which all intermediate goods are hired in the same quantity yt, nal output is
given by Yt = N1+vt yt. Accordingly, an expansion in the number of rms raises the nal goods
production more (less) than proportionally if v > 0 (v < 0). This implies that there are constant
returns to the quantities employed of a xed variety of intermediate goods, but either increasing or
decreasing returns to an expansion in such a variety, while holding the quantity employed of each
intermediate good xed. Aghion and Howitt (1998, p. 407) argue that [f]or while having more
products denitely opens up more possibilities for specialization, and of having instruments more
closely matched with a variety of needs, it also makes life more complicated and creates greater
chance of error. . . . The former statement refers to the so-called production-enhancing e¤ect, while
the latter refers to the so-called production-complexity e¤ect (Bucci, 2013). The case where v > 0
in our model corresponds to a situation in which the production-enhancing e¤ect dominates the
production-complexity e¤ect, and vice versa.
It is important to note that the specication of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Devereux et al.
(1996a, 2000) refers to N
1

t yt, indicating that monopoly power and increasing returns to specializa-
tion (to an expansion in variety) are characterized by the same parameter . Thus, it is di¢ cult
to distinguish what arises due to market imperfections and what is due to increasing returns. To
overcome this shortcoming, we specify (10) in order to clearly separate increasing/decreasing re-
turns from imperfect competition, so that both e¤ects can be fully disentangled, as in Bénassy
(1996) and Pavlov and Weder (2012). At the same time, we can consider both increasing returns
to production specialization (IRPS) and decreasing returns to production specialization (DRPS) in
a unied model.
With (10), we can derive the nal good producers demand for intermediate goods as follows:
pt(i) =

Yt
yt(i)
1 
N
(v+1  1 )
t ; (11)
indicating that the price elasticity of demand for the ith intermediate good is 11  . A larger  implies
a higher price elasticity of demand for the intermediate good and, accordingly, the intermediate-
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good sector is more competitive.
2.2.2 Intermediate-good rms
The intermediate-good sector is monopolistically competitive. Each intermediate-good rm employs
capital kt(i) and labor ht(i) to produce intermediate goods according to the following production
technology:
yt(i) = Zt [kt(i)]
 [ht(i)]
1    ; (12)
where Zt is a production externality,  (1   ) is the capital (labor) share, and  is an overhead
cost that is paid in units of the intermediate good. To generate perpetual growth, we assume that
Zt = ZK

t , where Z is the technology parameter, Kt is the economy-wide capital stock, and 
measures the degree of the production externality.
With the demand function (11) and production function (12), the intermediate-good rm max-
imize its prots
!t(i) = pt(i)yt(i) Wtht(i) Rtkt(i); (13)
by choosing capital kt(i) and labor ht(i). The corresponding rst-order conditions are respectively
given as follows:
Rt =




pt(i)
yt(i) + 
kt(i)
; (14)
Wt =

1  


pt(i)
yt(i) + 
ht(i)
: (15)
Accordingly, we obtain the price markup of the intermediate-good rms  = 1 .
2.3 Government
Given that the nominal money supply is St and Pt is the price of the nal good, the real money
balance is given by: Mt  StPt . Thus, the evolution of real money balances is expressed as:
_Mt
Mt
= t   t; (16)
where  =
_St
St
denotes the growth rate of nominal money supply, which is the monetary author-
itys policy instrument. To balance the governments budget, the seigniorage that the government
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receives from money growth is rebated to households in a lump-sum manner, i.e.:
Tt =
_St
Pt
= tMt = _Mt + tMt: (17)
2.4 Balanced-Growth-Path (BGP) Equilibrium
We conne the analysis to a symmetric equilibrium where kt(i) = kt, ht(i) = ht, yt(i) = yt,
pt(i) = pt, Kt = Ntkt(i), and Ht = Ntht(i) for all i 2 [0; Nt]. Perfect competition in the nal-good
sector implies pt = Nvt . Moreover, free entry leads to a zero-prot condition for the intermediate-
good sector. By substituting (14) and (15) into (13), the zero-prot condition is given by yt =

 1 .
Combining these resulting relations with (12) yields the number of rms:
Nt =

   1


ZK+t H
1 
t : (18)
Equation (18) indicates that a larger markup, , raises the rms prots which attract new entrants
that in turn increase the number of rms, Nt. With (18), under a symmetric equilibrium Yt =
N1+vt yt, we can use (10) to derive the aggregate output of the nal good (i.e., gross domestic
product):
Yt =
1


   1

v
A[K+t H
1 
t ]
1+v; (19)
where A  Z1+v. We impose:
Assumption 1. (Capital Externality)  = 11+v   .
This assumption indicates that the degree of the capital externality must satisfy  = 11+v  so that
the aggregate production in (19) exhibits constant returns to scale for capital, which guarantees
substained growth.
Accordingly, we can rewrite (14) and (15) as follows:
RtKt = Yt and WtHt = (1  )Yt: (20)
Let 
t =
R Nt
0 !t(i)di = Nt!t. Given (20), putting the budget constraints of household (2) and
government (17) together yields the following aggregate resource constraint:
_Kt = Yt   Ct   Kt: (21)
A competitive equilibrium is dened as a set of market clearing prices and quantities such
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that: (i) the representative household maximizes its lifetime utility, i.e., (4)-(7); (ii) the nal-good
and intermediate-good rms maximize their prots, i.e., (11), (14), and (15); and the government
balances its budget constraint, i.e., (17). Thus, a non-degenerate BGP equilibrium is a tuple of
paths such that output Yt, consumption Ct, capital Kt and the real money balance Mt, grow at a
positive constant rate and the ination rate t is a positive constant.
We now characterize the dynamic system of the model. By using (5), (20), and (19), we rst
derive
B = 1;t

1  


   1

v
AKtH
 1
t ; (22)
where   v + (1 + v) is a composite parameter.
Assumption 2. (Labor Externality)   v + (1 + v) < 1, or equivalently v < 1  (given
 = 11+v   ).
Assumption 2 is a su¢ cient condition for ensuring the steady-state determinacy. This echoes the
nding of Chang et al. (2011) whereby indeterminacy occurs if there exist IRPS (v > 0) and their
degree is substantially large (v > 1 ) in our terminology.
Di¤erentiating (22) with respect to time t leads to
_1;t
1;t
+
_Kt
Kt
+ (   1)
_Ht
Ht
= 0:
Dene the transformed variable Xt  Ct=Kt. By combining the above equation with (7), (20),
(19), and (21), we then obtain the following di¤erential equation:
_Ht
Ht
=
1
1  

1  


   1

v
AHt  Xt + 

: (23)
From (9), (20), and (19), we derive the relationship of ination:
t =
1

24 1 

 1

v
AH 1t
BXt
  1
35  


   1

v
AHt + :
With this, (16) and (21) allow us to obtain another di¤erential equation as follows:
_Xt
Xt
= Xt   1

24 1 

 1
 
v
AH 1t
BXt
  1
35  1  


   1

v
AHt + : (24)
Based on (23) and (24), the dynamic system can be reduced to a 2 2 one in terms of Ht and Xt.
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In the steady state, the values of hours worked and the consumption-capital ratio are stationary
and satisfy the equilibrium conditions _Ht = 0 and _Xt = 0. In what follows, we denote the steady-
state value by leaving out the variables time subscript. Thus, we have:
Theorem 1 (Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium) Under the condition HX < 1 B ,
there exists a nondegenerate, unique BGP equilibrium, which is locally determinate.
Proof. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
In the BGP equilibrium, the economy exhibits common growth in which consumption Ct, capital
Kt, output Yt, and real money balances Mt all grow at the same rate g. It follows from (4), (6),
and (7) that the familiar Euler equation:
_Ct
Ct
= Rt       holds true. Accordingly, we can easily
obtain the balanced-growth rate:
g =
_Ct
Ct
=



   1

v
AH      : (25)
3 Growth, Welfare, and Welfare Cost of Ination
In this section, we examine the growth and welfare e¤ects of the money growth rate, , along
the BGP equilibrium. In particular, we discuss the role played by the price markup, , and
IRPS/DRPS, v. To examine the welfare e¤ect, we need to calculate social welfare based on the
households utility (1). Along the BGP, the initial consumption-capital ratio refers to C0 = XK0,
where X = 1 

 1

v
AH+. By normalizing the initial capital stock K0 to unity, social welfare
can be computed as:
U =
1


lnC0 +
g

 BH

=
1


lnX +
g

 BH

: (26)
3.1 Growth and Welfare E¤ects
Based on (25) and (26), we derive the e¤ects of ination (or the money growth rate) on economic
growth and social welfare, which lead to the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Growth and Welfare E¤ects ) In the presence of monopolistic competition
with endogenous entry,
(i) a higher growth rate of money supply, , decreases the balanced-growth rate, g;
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(ii) social welfare U is monotonically decreasing in the money growth rate, , implying that the
optimal monetary policy follows Friedmans rule with a zero nominal interest rate;
(iii) the negative e¤ects on growth and welfare are amplied (resp. attenuated) by the price markup,
, if there exist IRPS, v > 0, and the degree of IRPS is relatively high, v >    1 (resp. low,
v <    1). If the economy exhibits DRPS, the price markup unambiguously alleviates the
negative e¤ect of the money growth rate on growth and welfare.
A higher money growth rate is associated with a higher ination rate, which raises the cost of
consumption relative to leisure. Therefore, households, on the one hand, decrease their consumption
(hence the consumption-capital ratio X falls), and on the other hand, increase their leisure (hence
hours worked H decrease). A decrease in consumption lowers the intermediate-good rmsprots,
which decreases the equilibrium number of rms and hence the aggregate marginal product of
capital, YtKt , where Yt = N
1+v
t yt. A reduction in hours worked decreases the rmsdemand for
capital, which slows down capital accumulation. Both result in a fall in the balanced-growth rate
g.
Of particular interest, the growth e¤ect of ination hinges upon the market competition intensity
or markup, . In the presence of a higher markup, intermediate-good rms will exercise their
monopoly power to raise prices through cutting their output. This, on the one hand, leads the
rms to demand less labor, and on the other hand, lowers the elasticity of the aggregate demand
for labor. With endogenous entry, a higher markup, however, may increase the aggregate demand
for labor. Higher monopoly power increases the rmsprots, creating an incentive for new rms
to enter the market. If the presence of endogenous entry leads to IRPS (v > 0), the increase in
the number of rms will generate a strong external e¤ect, expanding the aggregate labor demand
and its elasticity with respect to wages. It turns out that if v >    1, the latter e¤ect dominates,
and as a result, a higher markup is associated with a stronger demand for labor with a higher
elasticity. In the presence of a stronger and more elastic labor demand, the negative labor e¤ect of
an expansionary monetary policy becomes more pronounced when ination discourages households
from supplying labor. Therefore, the negative impact on growth is reinforced by the price markup.
By contrast, if v <   1, the price markup will alleviate, rather than aggravate, the negative e¤ect
of ination on growth.
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In response to an expansionary monetary policy, while households leisure increases, social
welfare decreases given that ination slows down growth and lowers the consumption-capital ratio.
Thus, social welfare is monotonically decreasing in the money growth rate. This implies that the
Friedman rule is socially optimal in our model in the sense that an optimal rate of ination is
negative, referring to a zero nominal interest rate. More importantly, since the negative welfare
e¤ect of ination stemming from growth (and the consumption-capital ratio) dominates its positive
e¤ect stemming from leisure, the inuence of a price markup on welfare is similar to that on growth.
Therefore, as shown in Proposition 1(iii), the markup aggravates the e¤ect of ination if v >   1,
but alleviates the e¤ect of ination if v <    1. As is evident, if the economy exhibits DRPS
(v < 0), the condition v <   1 is true. Under such a situation, the negative e¤ects on growth and
welfare unambiguously become less pronounced in a less competitive market.
3.2 Welfare Cost of Ination: Quantitative Analysis
The analytical study above has shown that the price markup and returns to production specializa-
tion both play an important role in terms of governing the growth and welfare e¤ects of ination.
It is important to numerically calculate the welfare costs of ination, and accordingly, quantify the
importance of the price markup in terms of the welfare e¤ect of ination. To this end, we use data
for the US from 1959-2012 to calibrate the endogenous growth model of monopolistic competition
with endogenous entry.
In the benchmark, each structural parameter is either set a conventional value or matched to
an empirical moment in the US. For simplicity, the discount rate  is set to 0:04. The price markup
is set as  = 1:28, which corresponds to an intermediate value of the empirical estimates reported
in Jones and Williams (2000). The IRPS parameter is set to v = 0:3, which is the value of the
empirical estimates in Paul and Siegel (1999). In line with Devereux et al. (2000), we set the unit
overhead cost as  = 0:1. Accordingly, we calibrate the parameter  = 0:47 in order to match the
capital share of output of 0:3. The leisure parameter B is set to be 2:58, which satises a standard
ratio of labor supply of 0:33. As for the capital depreciation rate, we calibrate  = 0:05 by matching
the investment-capital ratio of 0:08. We set the consumption-CIA parameter as  = 0:26, which
matches the ratio of M1 to consumption. We consider the initial money growth rate  = 6:8%, so
that the annual ination rate is 3:6%. Finally, the technology parameter is set as A = 1:11 (i.e.,
11
Z = 1:08), so that the output growth rate is 3:2%. Thus, the value of social welfare is U =  29:76
in the benchmark. These parameter values are summarized in Table 1 below.
Table 1: Calibrated parameter values
       v  A B
0.30 0.04 1.28 0.26 0.10 0.47 0.068 0.30 0.05 1.11 2.58
Under these selected and calibrated parameters, we then compute the e¤ects of the money
growth rate on growth and welfare. We lower  from 0:068 to  0:04 so that the nominal interest rate
declines and approaches zero (i.e., the Friedman rule holds). We consider a variety of price markups
 2 [1:18; 1:38] to highlight the importance of a price markup. The changes in g are expressed in
percentage points, and the changes in U are expressed in the usual equivalent variations in annual
consumption, i.e., the welfare costs of ination. The results are reported in Table 2 which allows
us to establish Result 1 as follows:
Result 1 (Welfare Cost and Markup) In the presence of monopolistic competition with en-
dogenous entry and IRTS,
(i) in the benchmark with a price markup  = 1:28, the welfare gain from reducing ination to
the optimal level (welfare cost of ination) is 8:796%, which is associated with an increase in
growth of 0:346%;
(ii) the welfare cost of ination exhibits an inverted U-shaped relationship with the price markup;
a. if  < 1:3, the welfare cost of ination is increasing in the markup;
b. if  = 1:3, the welfare cost of ination reaches a maximum at 8:801%;
c. if  > 1:3, the welfare cost of ination is decreasing in the markup.
In the literature, estimates of the welfare costs of moderate ination are generally modest or
small, as noted in the Introduction. For appropriate comparisons, we simply compare Result 1 with
Wu and Zhang (2000) and Chu et al. (2012) who also calculate the welfare cost in a CIA model
with product market imperfections. In an RBC model of monopolistic competition with increasing
12
returns to scale, Wu and Zhang (2000) show that the welfare cost is around 2:7%. In an endogenous-
growth model of R&D, Chu et al. (2012) obtain a welfare cost of 1:76%. By shedding light on
IRPS, Result 1 shows a signicantly higher welfare cost: the gure is 8:796% in an endogenous
growth model of monopolistic competition with endogenous entry.
There are two monetary policy objectives: (a) the Friedman rule and (b) price stability (or
equivalently, zero ination) which are commonly analyzed in the literature (see Dotsey and Ireland,
1996). As an alternative, one may also estimate the welfare cost under the zero-ination objective.
Under our parametrization, the corresponding welfare cost is 2:72%. This gure is only one-third
of that under the Friedman rule, but it is still nonnegligible. Dotsey and Ireland (1996) nd that
reducing ination from 4% to 0% leads to a welfare gain of about 1% of output. In a search-theoretic
model of monetary exchange, Lagos and Wright (2005) nd that the welfare gain from reducing
ination from 10% to price stability is around 3% to 5% in terms of consumption. By developing
a search-and-matching endogenous growth model, Chu et al. (2014) obtain a welfare gain of about
1:6% of consumption through a reduction in ination from 4% to 0%.
Table 2: Growth and welfare e¤ects of monetary policy under  2 [1.18,1.38]
 1.18 1.20 1.22 1.24 1.26 1.28 1.30 1.32 1.34 1.36 1.38
g (%) 0.336 0.340 0.342 0.344 0.345 0.346 0.347 0.346 0.345 0.344 0.343
U (%) 8.547 8.637 8.703 8.749 8.780 8.796 8.801 8.797 8.784 8.764 8.738
Wu and Zhang (2000) show that the greater the monopoly power the rms have (the less the
intensity of competition among rms), the higher the welfare cost is. However, our estimates refer
to a non-monotonic relationship between the intensity of competition (or markup) and the welfare
cost of ination. Proposition 1(iii) has indicated that the welfare e¤ect of ination could be either
positively or negatively related to the price markup. Table 2 further shows that the welfare cost of
ination exhibits an inverted U-shaped relationship with the price markup. This implies that the
status quo product market competition (or markup) plays a crucial role in terms of governing the
ination cost caused by an inappropriate monetary policy. Our numerical analysis reveals that when
the status quo price markup is relatively low,  < 1:3, the cost of ination is more pronounced in a
less competitive market. By contrast, when the status quo price markup is relatively high,  > 1:3,
the cost of ination turns out to be less pronounced in a less competitive market. The welfare
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cost of ination is not necessarily decreasing in the intensity of product market competition. One
may note that if the economy exhibits DRPS (v < 0), the relationship between the price markup
and the welfare e¤ect of ination becomes unambiguously negative (as indicated in Proposition 1)
and hence the non-monotonic relationship between the markup and welfare cost of ination will
disappear as well.
Next, we turn to a discussion regarding the relationship between the welfare cost and IRPS. In a
variety of IRPS v 2 [0:2; 0:4], the results are shown in Table 3. The relevant results are summarized
as follows:
Result 2 (Welfare Cost and IRPS) In the presence of monopolistic competition with endoge-
nous entry and IRPS, the welfare cost of ination is unambiguously increasing in the degree of
IRPS.
The intuition is straightforward. Higher ination discourages households from consumption. With
endogenous entry, a decrease in consumption lowers the intermediate-good rmsprots, which
decreases the number of rms. Under a symmetric equilibrium with Yt = N1+vt yt, the reduction
in the equilibrium number of rms retards economic growth and in turn decreases social welfare.
Given a lower number of rms, the higher that the degree of IRTS, v, is, the more that the balanced-
growth rate g falls. As a result, welfare U also decreases by a larger magnitude. Thus, the cost of
ination is increasing in the degree of IRPS, as shown in Figure 3.
Table 3: Growth and welfare e¤ects of monetary policy under v 2 [0.2,0.4]
v 0.20 0.22 0.24 0.26 0.28 0.30 0.32 0.34 0.36 0.38 0.40
g (%) 0.306 0.314 0.322 0.330 0.338 0.346 0.353 0.360 0.367 0.374 0.380
U (%) 7.303 7.610 7.913 8.211 8.506 8.796 9.083 9.366 9.646 9.922 10.195
4 Concluding Remarks
Estimates of the welfare costs of moderate ination are generally modest or small. By shedding
light on IRPS, this paper has shown that there is a substantial welfare cost in an endogenous growth
model of monopolistic competition with endogenous entry.
We have shown that the negative e¤ects of ination on growth and welfare are amplied by
a price markup if IRPS exist in the economy and their degree is relatively high. As a result,
the welfare cost of ination exhibits an inverted U-shaped relationship with the price markup.
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When the status quo price markup is relatively low, the cost of ination is more pronounced in a
less competitive market. Otherwise, the cost of ination is less pronounced in a less competitive
market. This implies that the welfare cost of ination is not necessarily decreasing in the intensity
of product market competition. This result is in contrast to the conventional notion, as in Wu and
Zhang (2000), which predicts that the less the intensity of competition among rms, the higher
the welfare cost. In addition, we have also found that the cost of ination rises with the degree of
IRPS.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. Linearizing (23) and (24) around the steady-state equilibrium, we have:
_Ht
_Xt

=

a11 a12
a21 a22
 
Ht  H
Xt  X

; (A1)
where
a11 =

1  

1  


   1

v
AH, a12 =   H
1   ,
a21 =
1  


   1

v 1  
B
  XH

AH 2, a22 =

1 


 1
 
v
AH 1
BX
+X.
Let 1 and 2 be two characteristic roots of this dynamic system. According to the Jacobian
matrix, we further obtain:
Tr(J) = 1 + 2 =

1  

1  


   1

v
AH +

1 


 1
 
v
AH 1
BX
+X, (A2)
Det(J) = 12 =

1 


 1
 
v
AH 1
B (1  )X



1  


   1

v
AH + (1  )X

. (A3)
It is clear from (A2) and (A3) that the there are two roots with positive real parts in the dynamic
system, provided that  < 1. Given that both Ht and Xt are jump variables, this implies that the
steady-state equilibrium is locally determinate.
Figure A: The Steady-State Equilibrium
It follows from (23) that the _Ht = 0 locus intersects the Xt-coordinate at lim
Ht!0
Xt =  > 0 and
is upward sloping, i.e.: 
@X
@H

_Ht=0
=
1  


   1
 
v
AH 1 > 0.
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From (24), we derive lim
Ht!0
Xt =1 and the slope of the _Xt = 0 locus is negative, i.e.,

@X
@H

_Xt=0
=
1 


 1
 
v
AH 1

 1
B
1
XH + 

"
1 + 1
1 


 1
 
v
AH 1
BX2
# < 0;
provided thatXH < 1 B . Accordingly, the existence and uniqueness of the steady-state equilibrium
can be guaranteed, as shown in Figure A above.
Proof of Proposition 1. Based on (23) and (24) with _Ht = 0 and _Xt = 0, it is easy to derive:
@g
@
=  


1  

BXH

< 0, (A4)
@U
@
=   B	H
2[1 +  (+ )]
< 0, (A5)
where   (1   ) + [1 +  (+ )]BH > 0 and 	   (+ )
h
1 +


1 

X

i
+ v + (1 +
v)(X   ) > 0. It follows from (16) and (25) that along the BGP, the following relationship must
hold:
g =    = R     .
Given that the nominal interest rate is i = R   + , we can easily obtain:
i = + .
Social welfare U is decreasing in , but the nominal interest rate i is increasing in . Therefore,
social welfare is maximized as the nominal interest rate approaches zero and the Friedman rule
holds.
In addition, from (A4) and (A5), we further obtain:
@
@
@g@
 = BH(1  )2
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)

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where  = 
2( 1)

 1

v 
1 + X

AH [v   (   1)] ? 0 if v ?    1.
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